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INTRODUCTION 
The federal judiciary is a vital part of the United States government 
and is central to democracy. Like many other segments of our nation's gov-
ernment and society, the demographics of the federal judiciary have not 
mirrored those of the population in the United States, either historically or 
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currently.' For centuries, only white men were able to serve as judges on the 
nation's courts. 
Close to the mid-twentieth century, however, the make-up of the fed-
eral judiciary slowly began to change. Women, particularly white women, 
began to receive appointments to the federal bench when President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt appointed the first female Article III judge, Florence Ellin-
wood Allen, to the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1934 and Presi-
dent Harry S. Truman appointed the second female Article III judge and 
first female federal district court judge, Burnita Shelton Matthews, to the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in 1949.2 Men of color, too, 
began to receive appointments to the federal bench, though they began to 
receive them at a much later date and in slower spurts than white women. 
The first African American male Article III judge was not appointed to the 
bench until 1949 when President Truman appointed William H. Hastie to 
the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals.3 However, a glaring absence of 
women of color in the federal judiciary remained. It was not until 1966 that 
a woman of color was finally appointed to the federal bench. That woman, 
Constance Baker Motley, was appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson to 
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.4 
Today, both the percentages of white women and men of color on the 
federal bench are very low, with white women representing only 22% of all 
active federal judges on the U.S. District Court, U.S. Court of Appeals, and 
U.S. Supreme Court and men of color-African American, American Indi-
an, Asian American, and Latino---representing only 15% of all those same 
judges.5 Women of color-African American, American Indian, Asian 
American, and Latina-fall even further behind their proportion of the pop-
ulation in the United States, making up just 9% of all active federal judges 
on the U.S. District Court, U.S. Court of Appeals, and U.S. Supreme Court.6 
1. See infra Section I.A. 
2. See Mary L. Clark, One Man's Token Is Another Woman's Breakthrough? The 
Appointment of the First Women Federal Judges, 49 VILL. L. REV. 487, 492, 504 (2004). 
3. Derrick Bell, Law, Litigation, and the Search for the Promised Land, 76 GEO. 
L.J. 229, 229 (1987) (reviewing MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP: LEGAL STRATEGY 
AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION 1925-1950 (1987)); Paul Finkelman, Not Only the Judg-
es' Robes Were Black: African-American Lawyers As Social Engineers, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
161, 168 (1994) (reviewing J. CLAY SMITH, JR., THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 1844-
1944 (1993)). 
4. Anita F. Hill, The Embodiment of Equal Justice Under the Law, 31 NOVA L. 
REv. 23 7, 255 (2007) (citing Clark, supra note 2, at 515). 
5. History of the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUD. CENTER http://www.fjc.gov/hist 
ory/home.nsf/page/research _ categories.html (last visited Sept. 17, 20 12) (providing a search 
engine with results indicating 794 total federal judges, 174 white female judges, and 121 
male judges of color). There are currently no active federal American Indian judges, male or 
female. /d. 
6. /d. 
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This Article argues that diversifying the federal judiciary with more 
women and men of color, but particularly with more women of color, is 
essential to moving forward and strengthening this country's democracy. 
Specifically, this Article responds to arguments by prominent feminists that 
having female "firsts" on the bench is not as critical as having the "right" 
women on the bench-"right" meaning those women who are invested in 
and supportive of what are traditionally viewed as women's issues.7 In so 
responding, this Article acknowledges the appeal of such arguments regard-
ing judicial service from the "right" women, but contends that, while 
achieving "firsts" (and "seconds" and more) on the bench for white women 
may not be as important as it was in the past, it is still crucial for women of 
color, who are nearly absent from the federal bench.8 Much like the "firsts" 
of white female judges all over the nation held important symbolic meaning 
for the advancement of white women and helped to change societal percep-
tions about who is and should be a judge, so, too, will the same "firsts" for 
women of color. However, for women of color to have a similar impact on 
society as their white sisters, appointments of women of color to the federal 
bench must occur in meaningful numbers; they must represent more than 
mere tokenism, and they should include women of color with a variety of 
backgrounds and viewpoints. 
Part I of this Article reflects upon the progress that has been made on 
the federal bench with respect to increasing the number of women on the 
bench as well as the barriers that women have faced and still face on the 
bench by examining the history of women's entrance into the federal judici-
ary. Part II of this Article then examines the limits of that progress, reveal-
ing not only that more gender diversity is needed on the bench, but also how 
progress with gender diversity on the bench has not occurred at equal levels 
for all women, particularly for women of color, during the last forty years. 
Finally, Part Ill of this Article argues that increasing women of color's ac-
cess to and visibility within the federal judiciary will not only facilitate 
broader, more well-informed decision making by courts, but also will serve 
an important symbolic and representative purpose that legitimizes this coun-
try's democracy. 
7. Barbara Babcock, Professor, and Nancy Gertner, Judge, Panelists at Association 
of American Law Schools (AALS) Workshop on Women Rethinking Equality Conference in 
Washington, D.C. (June 20-22, 2011) (indicating that female "firsts" were no longer crucial 
and that judicial service by the "right" women on the bench was more important). 
8. See infra Part liT. 
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I. WOMEN IN THE JUDICIARY: A HISTORY OF CHALLENGES AND PROGRESS 
A. The State of Gender in the Federal Judiciary 
The federal judiciary is currently one-third female and two-thirds 
male.9 This distribution is consistent between the U.S. District Court, U.S. 
Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court.10 Slightly more than thirty 
percent-30.83%--of the active federal district court judges are female. 11 
Similarly, women make up slightly more than thirty percent-30.54%--of 
the active judges in the federal courts of appeals. 12 The percentage is slightly 
higher at the U.S. Supreme Court, at thirty-three percent. 13 
Although women have not yet reached parity with men in terms of 
their numbers within the federal judiciary, significant progress, especially 
since President Barack Obama's election, has been made in changing that 
pattem. 14 However, reaching even this level of gender diversity on the fed-
eral bench has been painfully slow. Although the first Article III female 
judge, Florence Allen, was appointed to the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in 1934, it was not until a decade and a half later in 1949 that a second 
woman, Bumita Shelton Matthews, joined Allen on the federal bench. 15 In 
fact, female appointees to the federal bench did not exceed a token level 
until President Jimmy Carter began making judicial appointments. 16 Prior to 
President Carter's administration, only eight women had been appointed to 
an Article III federal judgeship.17 When President Carter took office in 
9. Women in the Federal Judiciary: Still a Long Way to Go, NAT'L WOMEN'S L. 
CTR. (Jan. 15, 20 13), http://www.nwlc.org/resource/women-federal-judiciary-still-long-way-
go-l#_edn5 [hereinafter Women in the Federal Judiciary]. 
10. /d. 
II. /d.; History of the Federal Judiciary, supra note 5. 
12. Women in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 9; History of the Federal Judiciary, 
supra note 5. 
13. Women in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 9; History of the Federal Judiciary, 
supra note 5; Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREME CT. OF THE 
UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 
2013) (identifying current female members Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia M. Sotomayor, and 
Elena Kagan). 
14. Women in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 9. 
15. Clark, supra note 2, at 492. 
16. /d. at 493. 
17. Lynn Hecht Schafran, Not from Central Casting: The Amazing Rise of Women in 
the American Judiciary, 36 U. ToL. L. REv. 953, 956 (2005); see also Clark, supra note 2, at 
489, 492-93 (identifying the first eight female appointees as Florence Ellinwood Allen in 
1934 to the Sixth Circuit by President Roosevelt; Burnita Shelton Matthews in 1949 to the 
District Court of D.C. by President Truman; Sarah Tilghman Hughes in 1966 to the Northern 
District Court of Texas by President Kennedy; Constance Baker Motley to the Southern 
District Court of New York in 1966 by President Johnson; June Lazenby Green in 1968 to 
the District Court of D.C. by President Johnson; Shirley Mount Hufstedler in 1968 to the 
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1977, he made the appointment of white women, women of color, and men 
of color a priority .18 By the end of his term, President Carter had increased 
the number of female judges from eight to forty. 19 
Like President Carter's efforts, President Obama's prioritizing diversi-
ty amongst judicial nominees has accelerated the progress of having a fed-
eral judiciary that more closely resembles the population and litigants it 
serves in this country. As of early 2013, forty percent of President Obama's 
judicial nominees have been women/0 and forty-one percent of confirmed 
nominees have been women.21 
B. The Continued Challenges and Difficulties of Being a Female Judge 
Although women have made great progress in filling the ranks of the 
judiciary since the late 1970s, their advancement has not occurred without 
barriers and challenges. Prior to 1970, women faced significant, explicit 
barriers to even achieving the credentials that enabled lawyers to obtain 
Article III judgeships. For example, many women were denied entry to law 
Ninth Circuit by President Johnson; Cornelia Kennedy in 1970 to the District Court of Mich-
igan by President Nixon; and Mary Anne Reimann Richey in 1976 to the District Court of 
Arizona by President Ford). 
18. Schafran, supra note 17, at 956. 
19. Based on a review of the Federal Judicial Center data, the authors have calculat-
ed that President Carter nominated forty-one successful female nominees to the federal 
bench; however, one of the nominees, Judge Cornelia Kennedy was not new to the bench, 
but rather was elevated from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. See History of the Federal Judiciary, supra 
note 5 (check boxes ''Nominating President" and "Gender"; select "Jimmy Carter" and "Fe-
male"; press the "Search" button) (resulting in the following list of female judges: Ann Al-
drich; Susan Harrell Black; Patricia Jean Ehrhardt Pernick Boyle; Ellen Bree Burns; Carmen 
Consuelo Cerezo; Barbara Brandriff Crabb; Orinda Dale Evans; Betty Binns Fletcher; Helen 
Jackson Frye; Susan Christine O'Meara Getzendanner; Ruth Bader Ginsburg; Joyce Hens 
Green; Norma Holloway Johnson; Shirley Brannock Jones; Amalya Lyle Kearse; Judith 
Nelsen Keep; Cornelia Groefsema Kennedy; Carolyn Dineen King; Phyllis A. Kravitch; 
Mary Johnson Lowe; Consuelo Bland Marshall; Gabrielle Anne Kirk McDonald; Diana E. 
Murphy; Dorothy Wright Nelson; Helen Wilson Nies; Marilyn Hall Patel; Mariana R. 
Pfaelzer; Sylvia H. Rambo; Mary Lou Robinson; Barbara Jacobs Rothstein; Elsijane Trimble 
Roy; Mary Murphy Schroeder; Stephanie Kulp Seymour; Norma Levy Shapiro; Dolores 
Korman Sloviter; Anna Katherine Johnston Diggs Taylor; Anne Elise Thompson; Patricia 
McGowan Wald; Zita Leeson Weinshienk; Veronica DiCarlo Wicker; and Rya Weickert 
Zobel); see also Mary L. Clark, Carter's Groundbreaking Appointment of Women to the 
Federal Bench: His Other "Human Rights" Record, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. PoL'Y & L. 
1131, 1132-33 (2003) (stating that President Carter appointed forty women to the bench). 
20. Women in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 9 (stating that eighty-seven out of 
President Obama's two hundred and seventeen judicial nominees have been women). 
21. /d. 
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school on the basis of their gender alone/2 and those who were finally ad-
mitted to law school faced discrimination, not just during law school, but 
also after graduation when law firms across the country refused to hire 
them.23 Many of these women opened up their own practices, entered into 
private practice with another woman, or joined a family member's prac-
tice.24 
Even for women who were able to overcome these obstacles to obtain 
the kinds of credentials that could land appointments to the federal bench, 
their mere nomination for an Article III judgeship did not come without a 
battle. First, male, home-state senators usually gave any open judicial seat 
to another man as a political reward.25 Furthermore, it was politically diffi-
cult to appoint a female judge to judgeships that had previously been held 
by men (as opposed to the few token women seats) because those judge-
ships were generally viewed as being reserved for men.26 Second, women 
22. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, United States Supreme Court Justice, Women's Pro-
gress at the Bar and on the Bench: Pathmarks in Alabama and Elsewhere in the Nation, 2004 
Albritton Lecture (Feb. 22, 2004), in 56 ALA. L. REV. I, 2 (2004). 
23. Clark, supra note 2, at 495 (describing the discrimination that Florence Allen 
faced when attempting to gain employment with Cleveland law firms, which led her to estab-
lish her own firm); id. at 511 (describing the discrimination that Sarah Hughes encountered 
trying to gain employment in private practice in Dallas); id. at 522-23 (describing the dis-
crimination that Shirley Hufstedler encountered in the Los Angeles job market); Deanell 
Reece Tacha, Women and Law: Challenging What Is Natural and Proper, 31 NOVA L. REV. 
259, 273 (2007) ("I, like all women lawyers of my generation, have similar stories, such as 
the time a partner at a law school interview said to me: 'Deanell, you have a very good rec-
ord, but don't you know that you have to be better than the men to get hired?' After law 
school, I ran into similar barriers."); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks On Women's Progress 
In The Legal Profession In The United States, 33 TULSA L.J. 13, 14 (1997) ("My ... col-
league and counselor, first woman appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Sandra Day 
O'Connor, confirms a report familiar to students who attended law schools in the 1950s, 
even in the 1960s. Justice O'Connor graduated from Stanford Law School in 1952 in the top 
of her class. Our Chief Justice, William Rehnquist, was in the same class, and he also ranked 
at the top. Young Rehnquist got a Supreme Court clerkship-then, as now, a much sought-
after job for young lawyers. No opportunity of that kind was open to Sandra Day. Indeed, no 
private firm would hire her to do a lawyer's work. 'I interviewed with law firms in Los An-
geles and San Francisco,' Justice O'Connor recalls, 'but none had ever hired a woman before 
as a lawyer, and they were not prepared to do so.' (Many firms were not prepared to break 
that bad habit until years after the U.S. civil rights legislation of the mid-1960s made it ille-
gal.)"). 
24. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 2, at 506 (stating that Judge Bumita Shelton Mat-
thews opened a law firm with two other female attorneys); id. at 527 (stating that Kennedy 
joined her father's firm). 
25. /d. at 489-90. 
26. /d. Similarly, Judge Motley opined that sexism prevented her elevation to the 
Second Circuit. See Anna Blackbume-Rigsby, Black Women Judges: The Historical Journey 
of Black Women to the Nation's Highest Courts, 53 How. L.J. 645, 671-72 (2010). Motley 
recounted sexism and racism as barriers that she had to overcome to gain her seat on the 
district court; however, she cited Justice Thurgood Marshall's prior seat on the Second Cir-
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usually had to pass higher standards in order to receive a nomination to the 
federal bench/7 and even then, they often received lower ratings from the 
ABA on their qualifications.28 
In addition to the barriers imposed on women prior to becoming judg-
es, female judges also encountered gender-specific challenges once they 
were on the bench, such as cold receptions from colleagues. For example, 
when Judge Allen joined the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, she was 
not congratulated by her male colleagues-quite the contrary, they ignored 
her.29 Additionally, Judge Allen's colleagues excluded her from group 
lunches by going to male-only clubs.30 Similarly, Judge Burnita Shelton 
Matthews, the first female judge to serve on a federal district court, was 
"assign[ ed] ... all the 'long motions,' the most technical and least reward-
ing part of the court's docket," by her colleagues.31 
Early women on the bench also faced disrespect from attorneys and 
litigants,32 lower judicial performance evaluations,33 requests for recusal on 
the basis of gender,34 and much more.35 For instance, when Judge Constance 
cuit as evidence that "largely" sexism, not racism, prevented her from gaining a seat on the 
Second Circuit. /d. 
27. Clark, supra note 2, at 540 ("Most importantly, the first eight women judges, 
taken as an aggregate, had significantly more public and judicial service prior to federal 
judicial appointment than did their male counterparts .... [T]his phenomenon is likely ex-
plained by a greater concern for demonstrated temperament, ability and, ultimately, credibil-
ity on the part of women by the federal court-appointing powers. Put simply, women candi-
dates were held to a higher standard."). 
28. /d. at 491-92, 512 (noting the ABA rating of Sarah Tilghman Hughes as unquali-
fied for the federal judiciary because of her age). 
29. /d. at 499 (quoting Judge Phyllis A. Kravitch, The Burnita Shelton Matthews 
Memorial Lecture in Law: Women in the Legal Profession: The Past 100 Years, 69 MISS. 
L.J. 57,63 (1999)). 
30. /d. at 499. 
31. Linda Greenhouse, Burnita S. Matthews Dies at 93; First Woman on U.S. Trial 
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1988, at D27; see also Clark, supra note 2, at 504, 510 (quoting 
id.). 
32. Schafran, supra note 17, at 958-59. 
33. /d. at 960-61 ("Not only did male attorneys rank female judges lower than men 
on every attribute measured, there were five attributes on which women lawyers ranked 
female judges significantly lower: compassion, courtesy, satisfactory performance as a mo-
tions judge, satisfactory performances as a settlement judge, and overall rating. This list is 
revealing because it shows that the expectations for women judges by both men and women 
are that they will be warm and nurturing. A male judge who strictly controls his courtroom 
runs a tight ship. His female counterpart is a bitch."). 
34. Blackburne-Rigsby, supra note 26, at 671 (providing Judge Motley's staunch 
opposition to a request for her to recuse herself from a gender discrimination lawsuit on the 
ground that she, a black woman, had faced discrimination); see also REGINA GRA YCAR & 
JENNY MORGAN, THE HIDDEN GENDER OF LAW 60 & n.28 (2d ed. 2002) (quoting Blank v. 
Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. l, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (opinion of Motley, J.) (providing 
Judge Motley's argument that all judges have a race and gender, and, if their race and/or 
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Baker Motley, the first African-American woman on the federal bench, was 
introduced at a session of new judges' school, the introducer chose to pro-
vide a very limited introduction that focused on her work for her church and 
on the board of the YMCA.36 That introduction of Judge Motley glaringly 
omitted her great accomplishments as a state senator and a civil rights litiga-
tor who argued on many occasions before the United States Supreme 
Court.37 
All of these examples of the difficulties that women have faced both 
on the way to and on the bench are merely illustrative and certainly not ex-
haustive, but they do make clear that the road to and on the federal judiciary 
has not been easy for women, regardless of their race. They also make clear 
that more work is needed in terms of improving gender diversity on the 
bench, even as there have been a meaningful number of "firsts" for white 
women on the federal bench. 
II. A BLEAKER LANDSCAPE FOR WOMEN OF COLOR JUDGES 
While progress for women on the bench, overall, has been slow, for 
some groups of women, it has been even slower. Women of color are just 
beginning to make real inroads into the federal judiciary. Indeed, women of 
color's access to Article III judgeships has been slow-coming and in small 
numbers. As noted previously, the first woman of color to serve in an Arti-
cle III judgeship, Constance Baker Motley, was not appointed until 1966.38 
Furthermore, it was not until President Carter's administration and his de-
liberate diversity push-which included appointing forty female judges and 
thirty-seven African-American judges (seven of whom were African-
American women}--that an African-American woman was appointed to an 
appellate judgeship.39 That woman, Amalya Kearse, was appointed to the 
U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 1979.40 Even so, it took more than 
forty years from Judge Motley's appointment to the U.S. District Court for 
gender were a valid basis for recusal, then no judge would be able to hear such cases)); 
Schafran, supra note 17, at 959. 
35. Clark, supra note 2, at 503 {"As for [U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge 
Florence] Allen's Supreme Court prospects under Truman, he went so far as to have an ad-
ministration aide consult Chief Justice Fred Vinson on the possibility of her appointment to 
the Supreme Court and was told that it would undermine the collegiality of the Court, with 
justices no longer able to discuss cases with their feet up and robes off."); id. at 506 (citing 
the D.C. Bar Association's denial of admission to Burnita Shelton Matthews and stating that 
when women were admitted to bar associations, they were denied leadership positions which 
"impeded women in the federal judiciary since the time of their first appointments"). 
36. Blackburne-Rigsby, supra note 26, at 671. 
37. /d. 
38. Hill, supra note 4, at 255. 
39. Blackburne-Rigsby, supra note 26, at 660, 674. 
40. /d. at 674. 
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the Southern District of New York and over thirty years from Judge 
Kearse's appointment to the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals for a 
woman of color to be appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court.41 In 2009, Jus-
tice Sonia Sotomayor, a Latina, was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court 
by President Barack Obama.42 
Overall, among the nation's 794 active federal judges, there are now 
sixty-five women of color serving as active federal judges, including thirty-
three African-American women (twenty-six on the District Court and seven 
on the Court of Appeals), twenty-five Hispanic women (twenty-two on the 
District Court and three on the Court of Appeals), eight Asian-American 
women (seven on the District Court and one on the Court of Appeals), and 
one woman of Hispanic and Asian descent (on the District Court).43 No 
American Indian woman currently serves as a federal judge at any level-
trial, appellate, or supreme.44 In the end, only 8.62% of active federal Article 
III judges are women of color.45 
In addition to having low numerical representation within the federal 
judiciary, women of color, much like their white female peers, have faced 
and continue to face the barriers and challenges that were laid out in Part II. 
This gender barrier, however, is racialized, which, as Kimberle Crenshaw's 
theory of intersectionality explains, means that women of color judges en-
counter gender-related challenges that are distinct from those faced by white 
female judges.46 Lynn Hecht Schafran has explained this issue by using the 
41. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40. 
42. Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME CT. OF THE 
UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/aboutlbiographies.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 
2013). 
43. See History of the Federal Judiciary, supra note 5; Women in the Federal Judi-
ciary, supra note 9. 
44. Women in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 9. 
45. It is unclear whether progress is greater or lesser at the state level because there 
is not good data on the number of women of color in state judgeships. In collecting statistics, 
researchers often categorize by gender and race, but ignore the full identity of women of 
color who are at the intersection of both oppressions. See Blackbume-Rigsby, supra note 26, 
at 690. Although there is not great data on women of color in state judgeships as a whole, 
there is some data on black women judges. See id. at 677-78 (stating that black women make 
up two percent of the state judiciary). 
46. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Poli-
tics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241, 1242-44 (1991) (ex-
plaining that women of color are at the intersection of race and gender oppression); see also 
Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 
YALE L.J. 1757, 1775 (2003) (reviewing CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL 
RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002) (asserting that intersectionality is "a con-
cept that conveys at least the following two ideas: (I) that our identities are intersectional-
that is, raced, gendered, sexually oriented, etc.-and (2) that our vulnerability to discrimina-
tion is a function of our specific intersectional identities")). Intersectionality recognizes that 
power, privilege, disadvantage, and discrimination are influenced by interlocking spectrums 
of identity. /d. at 1775. For example, as Professor Crenshaw highlighted in her article, be-
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sociological concept of a "status set." Schafran explicates that a "status set" 
is used: 
to describe the expectation that an individual who holds one status in the world will 
also hold certain others. The status set for judges is still white and male. Thus, 
white women judges are one step removed from the "norm." Women of color 
judges are two steps removed. This lack of fit with peoples' expectations has many 
implications for how women judges, .particularly women of color, are perceived 
and treated by a wide array ofpeople.4 
In general, as Schafran provides, it is more difficult for women than 
men to gain respect from court employees and litigants, and that problem is 
exacerbated for women of color.48 For example, women of color likely face 
more hostile reception from attorneys and litigants in judicial evaluation 
surveys.49 Women of color also encounter race- and gender-based requests 
for recusal in the courtroom. 5° For example, in one case, the defendant in an 
employment discrimination lawsuit sought to disqualify Judge Motley from 
sitting on his case based on the rationale that she, as a black woman, had 
been discriminated against and would identify with those who have suffered 
race or sex discrimination.51 Judge Motley declined to recuse herself, ex-
plaining: 
"[I]f background or sex or race of each judge were, by definition, sufficient 
grounds for removal, no judge on this court could hear this case, or many others, 
by virtue of the fact that all of them were attorneys, of a sex, often with distin-
guished law firm or public service backgrounds."52 
In other words, although all judges, including white male judges, have 
a race or a sex that can affect their outlook, judges of color, and especially 
female judges of color, are primarily the ones who have their ability to be 
neutral arbiters challenged. These actions reveal how both whiteness and 
maleness have been defined as the norm in society. · 
Similarly, while all women are often ranked lower than equally per-
forming men for not conforming to feminine gender stereotypes, such as 
failing to act lady-like, 53 women of color may be particularly vulnerable to 
such mistreatment as a result of stereotypes, such as the fiery Latina, the 
cause the identities of black men and black women differ along the intersection of race, class, 
and sex, black men and black women may have distinct vulnerabilities to violence and dis-
crimination and may actually experience discrimination differently from one another. Cren-
shaw, supra, at 1242-43. 
47. Schafran, supra note 17, at 957. 
48. See id. at 958-59. 
49. /d. at 960. 
50. See id. at 959. 
51. See Blackbume-Rigsby, supra note 26 at 671. 
52. GRAYCAR & MORGAN, supra note 34 (quoting Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 
418 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (opinion ofMotley, J.)). 
53. See Schafran, supra note 17, at 960. 
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angry black woman, or submissive Asian flower.54 For example, black 
women and Latinas may often be assumed to be harsh, rude, and overbear-
ing--all traits that are in line with the stereotype of the Sapphire.55 Even if a 
black woman or Latina deliberately "works her identity"56 to counter and 
disprove this stereotype, she still may not benefit from her behavior. Rather, 
attorneys who are responding to the evaluation may be more predisposed to 
remember the Latina or black woman judge as the Sapphire and may unfair-
ly rate her negatively, regardless of her objective demeanor. For example, 
consider this lengthy analysis by Professor Darren Hutchinson comparing 
lawyers' different reactions to Justice Sotomayor, a Latina, and Justice Scal-
ia, a white man, which highlights how, unlike Justice Scalia, Justice So-
tomayor has been subjected to the fiery Latina stereotype. 57 In order to high-
light how the two Justices are generally viewed differently for similar be-
54. Asian American women have to contend with stereotypes that are different than 
those with which black women and Latinas must contend. See Pat K. Chew & Luke T. Kel-
ley-Chew, The Missing Minority Judges, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 179, 188-91 (2010) 
(describing stereotypes of Asian Americans); Sumi K. Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Ra-
cialized Sexual Harassment: Where the Model Minority Meets Suzie Wong, 1 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 177, 184 (1997). 
55. See Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY 
WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 426, 426 (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); 
Pamela J. Smith, Failing to Mentor Sapphire: The Actionability of Blocking Black Women 
from Initiating Mentoring Relationships, in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM 120, 120 (Adrien 
Katherine Winged., 2d. ed. 2003) (defining "modem-day Sapphires" as "angry, threatening, 
intimidating, unintelligent, Black and female"). 
56. The scholarship that we rely on here contends that every person has a "perfor-
mance identity"-that every person exercises choices that he or she makes about how to 
present his or her status marker of difference (status identity) to the world. Kenji Yoshino, 
Covering, Ill YALE L.J. 769, 892 (2002) (discussing the decision in Rogers and noting that 
the court used a limited definition of race, largely based on immutable traits expressive of 
phenotype); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 
1262-63 (2000) (describing the extra "identity work" that minorities must engage in to suc-
ceed at work). Other scholars have added to or critiqued this notion that marginalized group 
members may choose to emphasize or de-emphasize behaviors that are stereotypically under-
stood as belonging to a particular identity group. See Marc A. Fajer, A Better Analogy: 
"Jews," "Homosexuals," and the Inclusion of Sexual Orientation As a Forbidden Charac-
teristic in Antidiscrimination Laws, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 37, 45-47 (2001) (discussing 
within the workplace how gays and Jews may engage in "self-censorship" with regard to the 
traits most commonly associated with their identities); see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, 
Undercover Other, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 873, 885-94 (2006) (discussing the same about Blacks 
who are engaged in interracial relationships); cf Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality as 
"Catch 22 ": Why Identity Performance Demands Are Neither Harmless Nor Reasonable, 69 
ALB. L. REV. 299, 301 (2005) (criticizing identity performance demands as giving rise to 
"slippery slope fears about what will happen to all conformist demands and anti-essentialist 
fears about what legal condemnation of identity performance demands might symbolize"). 
57. See Darren Hutchinson, Scalia v. Sotomayor: The Use of Gender-Coded Lan-
guage to Evaluate a Judge's "Temperament," DISSENTING JUSTICE (May 8, 2009, 8:27 AM), 
http://dissentingjustice.blogspot.com/2009/05/scalia-v-sotomayor-use-of-gender-coded.htrnl. 
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havior on the bench, Professor Hutchinson contrasted individual comments 
that several lawyers had made over the careers of the two Justices, both of 
whom are known for asking many questions from the bench.58 Hutchinson 
asserted: 
Rather than being firm, but flexible, detached but engaged, [Sotomayor's] detrac-
tors describe her as a fiery Latina tempest waiting to knife and brutalize lawyers in 
the courtroom. A survey of lawyer comments from the AFJ [Almanac of the Fed-
eral Judiciary] report on Sotomayor confirms this view of Sotomayor among some 
lawyers: 
"Sotomayor can be tough on lawyers, according to those interviewed. 
'She is a terror on the bench.' 'She is very outspoken.' 'She can be diffi-
cult.' 'She is temperamental and excitable. She seems angry.' 'She is 
overly aggressive-not very judicial. She does not have a very good 
temperament.' 'She abuses lawyers.' 'She really lacks judicial tempera-
ment. She behaves in an out of control manner. She makes inappropriate 
outbursts.' 'She is nasty to lawyers. She doesn't understand their role in 
the system-as adversaries who have to argue one side or the other. She 
will attack lawyers for making an argument she does not like' .... 
'She dominates oral argument. She will cut you off and cross examine 
you.' 'She is active in oral argument. There are times when she asks 
questions to hear herself talk.' 'She can be a bit of a bully. She is an ac-
tive questioner.' 'She asks questions to see you squirm. She is very ac-
tive in oral argument. She takes over in oral argument, sometimes at the 
expense of her colleagues.' 'She can be very aggressive in her question-
ing.' 'She can get harsh in oral argument.' 'She can become exasperated 
in oral argument. You can see the impatience.' 'You need to be on top of 
it with her on your panel.'" 
... For Sotomayor, being a sharp interrogator and requiring lawyers to be 'on top 
of it' are negative qualities. These traits are not negative in most men, certainly not 
white men . 
. . . Compare the lawyer responses to [Justice) Sotomayor with the AFJ comments 
on Justice Scalia-whom many lawyers consider a tough questioner as well. While 
lawyers negatively describe Sotomayor's toughness, in Scalia, toughness receives 
praise, if not awe. Scalia's hazing of lawyers is just part of the understood fun 
among the brotherhood of lawyers. Although reviewers describe Scalia as tough, 
this does not make him a dangerous "out-of-control" she-judge. Notice the sporting 
and friendly hazing metaphors in the AFJ description of Scalia: 
"Never utter the words 'legislative history.' If you do, chances are Scalia 
will interject with a ridiculing harangue that makes it clear he views leg-
islative history as poppycock. Legislative debates are often contrived and 
can't trump the actual words of the statute, Scalia insists. But even if you 
play it safe, you can expect tough, persistent questioning from Scalia, of-
ten delivered with an almost gleeful lust for the sport of jabbing and 
jousting with advocates before him. And Scalia is an equal-opportunity 
jouster; even when his position seems obvious, Scalia will be just as hard 
on the lawyer he agrees with as the lawyer he'll oppose. Ever the law 
58. /d. 
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professor, Scalia will sometimes ask questions with no clear relevance, 
just to see if you are on your toes. In a now-legendary exchange during 
arguments on a federal rule that barred the advertising of the alcohol con-
tent of beer, Scalia asked a lawyer for Coors to define the difference be-
tween beer and ale. The lawyer, the late Bruce Ennis, answered without 
missing a beat, to the amazement of justices and spectators alike, and 
Coors won the case. But Scalia can be nasty, as well. When a lawyer 
once paused too long before answering his question, Scalia said sharply, 
'You have four choices, counselor: "Yes," "No," "I don't know," or "I'm 
not telling."' But the most important advice on how to sway Scalia at 
oral argument or in brief-writing is to buy his new book .... [One] tip: 
Don't use the kitchen sink strategy of throwing at the Court every con-
ceivable argument your legal team can think up. Pick your best three, at 
most, Scalia and Garner advise. 'Arm-wrestle, if necessary, to see whose 
brainchild gets cut. "'59 
Hutchinson fmished his analysis by noting that: 
1541 
In Scalia, toughness is positive; in Sotomayor, it is nonjudicial. If Scalia asks irrel-
evant questions, he is just being a dutiful "law professor" trying to hold the atten-
tion of his class. If Sotomayor does the same thing, she is just interested in hearing 
herself talk. When Scalia duels harshly with litigants, the "spectators" watch in 
amazement. If Sotomayor asks tough questions, she is seen as difficult, tempera-
mental, and excitable. The disparate treatment is too dense to deny.60 
Such realities in the experiences of women of color on the bench are 
in part the result of stereotypes about women of color, but they are also in 
part the result of the near complete absence of women of color from the 
bench. When women of color are absent from the bench, the implicit mes-
sages sent are that women of color lack the competence, temperament, and 
ability to serve as judges and that, when they act as their white male coun-
terparts do, what they are doing is wrong or unnatural. 
Ill. THE NEED FOR MORE WOMEN OF COLOR IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
(WITHOUT REGARD TO POLITICAL AFFILIATION) 
Now that there is a critical mass of women on the federal bench, a 
number of advocates for gender diversity have argued that the mere repre-
sentation of women on the bench alone is not material. "Firsts" are no long-
er critical, they say; rather, the focus should be on getting women who are 
concerned about women on the bench.61 In effect, these advocates downplay 
the importance of "firsts" for women on the bench, choosing instead to 
place an emphasis on getting the "right" women on the courts.62 However, 
59. 
24 (2012)). 
60. 
61. 
62. 
/d. (emphases omitted) (quoting 2 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 21-22, 
!d. 
See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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this argument, while very appealing politically, neglects the fact that there is 
no essential female experience. The argument is, in some sense, essentialist, 
meaning it implies that there is "a unitary, 'essential' ... experience [for 
women that] can be isolated and described independently of [gender,] race, 
class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience,"63 and it ignores 
Professor Crenshaw's point about intersectionality, which is that different 
groups may experience events and treatments differently based on the dif-
fering intersections of identity-categories-here, race and sex.64 In other 
words, the feminist argument against a focus on female judicial "firsts" (and 
"seconds") is problematic for the same reason that the first two waves of the 
feminist movement were: failure to account for women of color's experi-
ences.65 The fact is that women of color have not broken many barriers 
within the federal judiciary nor have they achieved many "firsts" on the 
federal bench; consequently, their placement on the bench, particularly as 
"firsts," would still hold strong symbolic meaning, and it also will likely 
enrich the process of judging, particularly where panels are involved; instill 
greater confidence in the courts for all the litigants who come before them; 
and increase general confidence in the system of democracy in the country. 
Great importance should be placed on ensuring intersectional, race and 
gender (with gender including sexuality) representation when selecting ju-
dicial nominees-and for reasons apart from and, more controversially, 
separate from the political ideology that the nominee may be perceived as 
advancing. While society has not reached a point where gender representa-
tion on the bench is no longer material, it particularly has not reached this 
point with regard to women of color. 
A. The Symbolic Value in Seeing Female Judges of Color 
Many reasons have been proffered for promoting gender and racial di-
versity on the bench.66 The strongest argument for increasing the number of 
63. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. 
REv. 581, 585 (1990) (defining essentialism by stating what anti-essentialism opposes); see 
also Emily M.S. Houh, Toward Praxis, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 905, 924-28 (2006) (defining 
both intersectionality and anti-essentialism). 
64. Harris, supra note 63; see supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
65. See MEGAN SEELY, FIGHT LIKE A GIRL: How TO BE A FEARLESS FEMINIST 59-65 
(2007) (noting that a major weakness of the feminist movement is the "divide among wom-
en[,] ... a disconnect that keeps us from unifying our efforts and achieving our collective 
goals" and cautioning that the third wave's biggest contribution to the movement must be 
bridging the gap among women along the lines of race, sexuality, class, and disability). 
66. See, e.g., Pat K. Chew, Judges' Gender and Employment Discrimination Cases: 
Emerging Evidence-Based Empirical Conclusions, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 359 (2011) 
(discussing the difference between the symbolic value of women on the bench and the sub-
stantive value and arguing that women's presence on the bench results in substantive differ-
ences). 
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women of color in the judiciary is symbolism. For women of color, "first" 
appointments to the bench are essential, regardless of political affiliation. 
The symbolic value of having more women of color serve on the federal 
bench is significant because it can illustrate to society and the legal commu-
nity that people who are not white males, or even white females, are capa-
ble of becoming federal judges and administering justice equitably. It re-
moves from the public's mind what is implied when women of color are 
absent from the bench. It removes the unspoken statement that women of 
color are not good enough or competent enough to serve on the bench. Jus-
tice Ruth Bader Ginsburg made similar comments about the potential im-
pact of having three female justices now sitting on the U.S. Supreme Court 
when she said, "When the schoolchildren file in and out of the court and 
they look up and they see three women, then that will seem natural and 
proper-just how it is."67 It is important for our society, too, to readily see 
that service on the bench by women of color is natural and proper. 
But, before the sight of female judges, including women of color, 
comes to be viewed as natural and proper, there is often an adjustment peri-
od for society in experiencing such changes. The very image of more female 
judges, both white and of color, may be a befuddling experience for specta-
tors. Consider, for instance, former U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
Judge Deanell Reece Tacha's description of the first time that an all-female 
judge panel presided over a case in her circuit.68 Retired Judge Tacha, now 
the Dean ofPepperdine University School of Law, noted that when the first 
all-female panel in her circuit was convened, it was thought to be a news-
worthy event.69 Implicit in the press's coverage of the panel was the as-
sumption that an all-female judicial panel was unnatural and foreign. Judge 
Tacha stated, "The reports in the press were comical for their non-
newsworthiness. The press reported comments, such as 'they were very well 
prepared,' and 'they asked good questions. "'70 As such commentary illus-
trates, despite claims and perceptions of gender equality in society, the pub-
lic may strangely be surprised when women perform a job traditionally re-
served for men and do so with the same competence expected from men. 
However, with time, and increased emphasis and follow-through on con-
firming more women, particularly women of color, to the bench, their pres-
ence will not be noted as extraordinary due to their gender or to their race 
and gender. 
67. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Opens Term with Three Women, Potential for 
Partisan Divide, WASH. POST. (Oct. 3, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/20 I 0/10/02/ AR20 10 I 00203382.html (quoting Justice Ruth Bader Gins-
burg). 
68. 
69. 
70. 
Tacha, supra note 23, at 276. 
!d. 
!d. 
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In the end, having women of color serve on the federal bench will car-
ry great symbolic value, not just for women and girls of color, but also for 
white women and girls and men and boys of all races. After all, women of 
color judges serve as role models through their mere presence, and role 
models are important because they provide hope and demonstrate to indi-
viduals, especially those who see themselves in the models, that such aspira-
tions are within reach for "someone like me.'m Professor Melinda Molina 
explains that "role models symbolically challenge the sense of 'otherness' 
that Latinas and all women of color encounter. A Latina lawyer counters 
this sense of otherness by conveying a positive message of acceptance and 
belonging."72 And, although white men have generally not had a shortage of 
role models with whom they could align themselves, the same is not true for 
women, and particularly for women of color. Including women of color in 
the judiciary is a much-needed signifier to our increasingly diverse populace 
that "'certain features of one's identity do not mark one as less able to gov-
ern. "'73 
In fact, one can readily see some of the dangers involved in not having 
this image of women of color as judges through some of Judge Motley's 
experiences on the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York. One of those dangers is the commonly held misperception that wom-
en of color cannot be neutral arbiters. The very fact that white men are 
overrepresented in numbers on the bench has led to assumptions of their 
inherent neutrality such that no one ever questions their biases, even where 
they share the race and sex of, for example, the alleged discriminators-
defendants-in an employment discrimination case. However, for women 
of color like Judge Motley, it was not uncommon for them to face requests 
for recusal from a discrimination lawsuit on the ground that they may iden-
tify with those who have suffered from race and/or sex discrimination.74 
Race- and gender-based recusals continue to be submitted by attorneys on 
behalf of litigants (perhaps even with the former's approval or advice) 
throughout the country.75 While sometimes the requests for recusal are made 
71. Melinda S. Molina, Role Models: Theory, Practice, and Effectiveness Among 
Latina Lawyers, 25 J. C.R. & EcoN. DEV. 125, 138 (2010) (discussing the benefit of role 
models in general and the likely effect that Justice Sotomayor's appointment to the Supreme 
Court will have on young Latinas to enter the legal profession). 
72. /d. at 131. 
73. Nancy Scherer, DiversifYing the Federal Bench: Is Universal Legitimacy for the 
US. Justice System Possible?, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 587, 598 (2011) (quoting Jane Mans-
bridge, Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent 
"Yes," 61 J. POLITICS 628, 651 (1999)). 
74. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52. 
75. See, e.g., Schafran, supra note 17, at 959 (discussing gender-based recusal re-
quests); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and Represen-
tation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REv. 95, 114-17 ( 1997) (discussing race-based 
recusal requests). 
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explicitly on the basis of race, judges of color also recount stories of more 
thinly-veiled requests for recusaU6 In general, such race-based recusal re-
quests are most often made by a defendant accused of a race-based or gen-
der-based wrong, such as employment discrimination,77 but requests for 
recusal have also been made by organizational parties, such as the Ku Klux 
Klan, with the rationale that all black people (but implicitly not white peo-
ple) are biased against the KKK. 78 Additionally, one male litigant submitted 
a request for recusal, asserting that it would be improper for him as a man to 
have to defer to a woman in the manner that one is required to do with a 
judge.79 Not surprisingly, we are aware of no white woman, woman of col-
or, or man of color who has submitted requests for a judge's recusal on the 
basis of gender, race, or race and/or gender, respectively, when they drew a 
white man as the judge in their case, including in a discrimination 
case80-another example that exposes how both whiteness and maleness 
have been normalized as neutral in society. 
Overall, race and gender-based requests for recusal reveal not only 
that some in society believe that white women, women of color, and men of 
color are not trusted to be neutral arbiters of justice (who can act with the 
integrity and impartiality that white men are assumed to possess)81 but also 
that the same individuals believe that the outlook of white women, women 
of color, and men of color on a case is predictable in a way that white men's 
views are not. Thus, the symbolism of fulfilling women of color judge 
"firsts" is a significant step in countering both implicit and explicit assump-
tions that women of color cannot or should not handle the revered task of 
76. See, e.g., Ifill, supra note 75, at 114-17 (discussing race-based recusal requests 
on the basis of black judges' former positions as civil rights attorneys, such as Judge Gabriel-
le McDonald in Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass 'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan or relation-
ships with other black leaders in the community, such as Judge Damon Keith in Baker v. City 
of Detroit). 
77. See, e.g., Schafran, supra note 17, at 959 (discussing a case from 2003 where a 
man requested a female judge to recuse herself because the allegations stated that the defend-
ant used vulgar language toward a female nurse and groped her); Ifill, supra note 75, at 114-
16 (discussing the "landmark 'race-recusal' case," Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Local 
Union 5442 and Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.'s poignant response and denial of the 
request and also discussing Judge Motley's request for recusal); Kevin R. Johnson & Luis 
Fuentes-Rohwer, A Principled Approach to the Quest for Racial Diversity on the Judiciary, 
10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 5, 22-23 (2004). 
78. Ifill, supra note 75, at 117 (citing Judge McDonald's former employment with 
the NAACP and the EEOC, as well as her identity as a black person-who must be biased 
against the KKK-as the basis for her recusal). 
79. Schafran, supra note 17, at 959 (citing a man's request in San Antonio, Texas). 
80. Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 77, at 23. 
81. Ifill, supra note 75, at 118 ("By seeking the recusal of African American judges 
based on the appearance of bias, these litigants suggest that true impartiality can be exercised 
only by white male judges."). 
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administering justice in society because they are uniquely biased against 
white people or men. 
B. Meaningful Numbers 
But, simply having a few more female judges of color is not enough. 
Women of color must join the federal judiciary at rates greater than mere 
token representation. Having a critical mass of women of color on the bench 
makes it possible for women of color judges to perform their jobs without 
being saddled with the additional duty of speaking for all women of color. 
Judge Anna Blackburne-Rigsby of the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals expressed this point when she wrote that "( o ]ur varied experiences 
illustrate the necessity of having a 'critical mass' of black women on our 
nation's state and federal appellate courts so that no single black woman 
feels 'isolated or like [a] spokesperson[] for [her] race [and gender]. "'82 
In addition to lessening the burden of being a spokesperson for other 
women of color, having a critical mass of women of color on the bench 
helps to ensure diversity of experience and exposure to diversity of experi-
ence from the benchY In summarizing her article on black women judges, 
Judge Blackburne-Rigsby wrote: "I have seen that being both black and 
female brings an important additional voice to the deliberative process, but 
that voice is varied because there is no singular 'black woman' perspec-
tive."84 In other words, having a critical mass of women of color on the 
bench helps to highlight the diversity of thought, perspective, and judicial 
philosophy among women of color. Shining a light on this diversity of 
thought serves as an effective tool for dulling the effects of unconscious 
prejudice and quelling stereotypes about whom a judge should be. For this 
reason, diversity of political ideology and background amongst female 
judges of color becomes very important in selection, as such diversity 
among women of color can further facilitate the breaking down of stereo-
types about women of color and their viewpoints by challenging the precon-
ceived notion that all women of color think the same way. 
One good example for illustrating this point is the contrast between 
the only two black U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Justice Thurgood Marshall 
82. Blackbume-Rigsby, supra note 26, at 689 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 318-19 (2003)). 
83. Assuming that all women, all black people, or all black women, for example, 
have the same experiences or viewpoints is known as essentialism. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 62-64. The argument that there is not one female or black or black female expe-
rience is known as anti-essentialism. See supra note 62. For a discussion of the problems 
inherent in racial essentialism and gender essentialism, particularly as it relates to the discus-
sion of black women, see generally Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist 
Legal Theory, in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra note 55, at 34. 
84. Blackbume-Rigsby, supra note 26, at 689. 
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and Justice Clarence Thomas. Both Justices grew up black in the United 
States and experienced racism; however, one was liberal, and the other is 
conservative.85 Both of the Justices' viewpoints were shaped and have been 
shaped by their racialized experience.86 They simply had and have two dif-
ferent "voices of color."87 If one were to rely on an essentialist notion of 
race, one would have predicted that the two Justices would decide all cases 
the same or, in the alternative, would attempt to rationalize Justice Thom-
as's approach by de-blackening him, calling him a race-traitor, or in some 
way denying him the ability to describe his reality.88 
A similar contrast exists between two black female judges, Judge Mot-
ley and Judge Janice Rogers Brown of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit.89 Although Judge Motley was a civil rights litigator for the 
NAACP prior to becoming a judge, and Judge Brown was not a civil rights 
litigator and is in fact conservative, they are both black female judges, and 
whether their writings invoke their racial backgrounds or not, they both 
have "voices of color.'>90 By seeing contrasts such as Justice Marshall and 
Justice Thomas and Judge Motley and Judge Brown, litigants will think 
twice before entering a request to recuse if they draw a female judge of col-
or because they will be less likely to think that her status is outcome-
determinative-in sum, stereotypes will be challenged. In the end, with ste-
reotypes breaking down, requests for judicial recusal will diminish, and so 
85. Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 77, at 12-16. 
86. For an in-depth discussion of Justice Thomas's raced jurisprudence, see general-
ly Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Just Another Brother on the SCT?: What Justice Clarence 
Thomas Teaches Us About the Influence of Racial Identity, 90 IOWA L. REV. 931 (2005). See 
also Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 77, at 12-16 (comparing Justice Thomas and 
Justice Marshall). 
87. Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 77, at 11-12. 
88. See generally Jacquelyn L. Bridgeman, Defining Ourselves for Ourselves, 33 
SETON HALL L. REv. 1261, 1265-67 (2005) (discussing terms "Sell-out," '"Uncle Tom," 
"Oreo," "lncognegro," "Traitor to the Race" for policing blackness within the black commu-
nity, especially as it relates to black conservatives such as Justice Thomas). 
89. Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 77, at 15-16. 
90. See generally Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Only Skin Deep?: The Cost of Partisan 
Politics on Minority Diversity of the Federal Bench, 83 IND. L.J. 1423 (2008) (discussing the 
concept of "voices of color" and the effect of race on the judicial confirmation of conserva-
tive Latinalo and African American judicial nominees and arguing that liberal and conserva-
tive racial minority judges must be recognized as voices of color); see also Johnson & 
Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 77, at 13-15 & n.44 (describing Judge Brown as "hav[ing] a 
distinctive voice as an African American woman of humble origins" and citing commonali-
ties with Justice Thomas in his opposition to affirmative action that was highlighted in his 
opinions in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 
(2003), as well as Judge Brown's opposition to affirmative action that was illustrated when 
she invalidated a public contractor outreach program on the basis that it violated the principle 
of colorblindness, which she stated is central to the Equal Protection Clause); Onwuachi-
Willig, supra note 86, at 990. 
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will the notion that women of color are less able than white men to set aside 
their biases as judges. 
Finally, meaningful numbers of women of color on the bench will help 
to counter the opposition that women of color nominees often face because 
of race and gender bias.91 Just increasing the number of women of color 
judges will make it more difficult for racist and sexist arguments, such as 
women of color's success being the result of special treatment through af-
firmative action or exceptionalism, to be put forth. For example, it would 
become harder to explain Justice Sotomayor as an "exception" to her race, a 
proclamation that implies that most other Latinas are incompetent or unwor-
thy of being federal judges.92 In conclusion, women of color with diverse 
backgrounds and political ideology should be appointed to the federal bench 
in order to combat racial and gender stereotypes, respect difference, and 
create a more welcoming, conducive work environment for women of color 
judges. 
C. Ensuring Democracy 
Additionally, having women of color on the bench is beneficial be-
cause it conforms with our democratic principles of inclusion and participa-
tion. A democracy is not at its best if all of its citizens are not included. 
Courts should reflect the composition of the populations that they serve.93 
Like white women and men of color, women of color, too, must be included 
within our democracy. 
Furthermore, the presence of women of color will benefit all members 
of the citizenry by strengthening the legitimacy of the judiciary in the eyes 
of communities of color, communities that are currently more likely to feel 
(and be) disenfranchised than Whites,94 for example.95 Race and gender di-
91. See, e.g., Molina, supra note 71, at 132-33 (citation omitted) (describing the 
commentary that questioned Justice Sotomayor's qualifications for the U.S. Supreme Court 
and discussing how those that see her may either continue to question her qualifications or 
see her as the "exception that proves the rule" that Latina lawyers are incompetent or unwor-
thy). 
92. !d. at 132. 
93. Tacha, supra note 23, at 272 ("If we are to be a representative democracy, our 
governmental institutions must reflect the diverse membership of our society, and we should 
work especially toward ensuring access for members of historically excluded groups, such as 
women and racial minorities."). 
94. Throughout this Article, we capitalize the word "Black" or "White" when we 
use them as nouns to describe a racialized group; however, we do not capitalize these terms 
when we use them as adjectives. Also, we prefer to use the term "Blacks" to the term "Afri-
can Americans," because the term "Blacks" is more inclusive. Additionally, we find that "(i]t 
is more convenient to invoke the terminological differentiation between black and white than 
say, between African-American and Northern European-American, which would be neces-
sary to maintain semantic symmetry between the two typologies." Alex M. Johnson, Jr., 
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versity on the bench helps to instill trust in the courts, and in the system of 
government as a whole. Defendants, plaintiffs, and attorneys of all races and 
sexes will all have greater trust in a court system that is reflective-at least 
on its face-of their realities. This is particularly true of the criminal justice 
system, which many communities of color do not view as a fair and legiti-
mate institution.96 By increasing the access to and visibility of women of 
color in the judiciary, the legitimacy of the judiciary, too, will be increased. 
D. Improving Decision Making 
Finally, creating greater diversity within the federal judiciary by nom-
inating and confirming more women of color will strengthen decision mak-
ing on affected courts-leading those members of the judiciary to think 
more broadly about legal issues and to consider more frequently life experi-
ences that are foreign to them. This will enhance the deliberative decision-
making process on panels. The ability of a judge to understand an experi-
ence provides valuable context for adjudicating issues in an informed man-
ner.97 One person will not have the experiential knowledge to adjudicate 
Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1044 n.4 (emphases omitted). Professor Kimberle Crenshaw, one of the 
founders of Critical Race Theory, has explained that "Black" deserves capitalization because 
"Blacks, like Asians [and] Latinos, ... constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, re-
quire denotation as a proper noun." Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, andRe-
trenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 
1331, 1332 n.2 (1988). 
95. See Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 77, at 28-30; see also MICHELLE 
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 
187-88, 192-95 (2010) (discussing the high rate of disenfranchisement of black men due to 
disproportionately high felon status, which overwhelmingly results in a loss of voting rights 
temporarily or permanently). 
96. See, e.g., Frank Newport, Blacks, NonBlacks Hold Sharply Different Views of 
Martin Case, GALLUP POL. (April 5, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/polUI53776/blacks-
nonblacks-hold-sharply-different-views-martin-case.aspx (finding a large racial divide in the 
perception of the killing of Trayvon Martin, a young black man, who was shot during an 
altercation with a non-black man and comparing it with a prior case where there was a large 
racial divide: the O.J. Simpson case, where Blacks and non-Blacks viewed the trial and lack 
of criminal conviction of O.J. Simpson for the murder of his non-black, specifically white 
ex-wife differently; concluding that these cases underscore black distrust of the criminal 
justice system as a source of justice for black people; and citing a 2008 Gallup Minority 
Rights and Relations survey, which "found that 67% of blacks said the American justice 
system was biased against blacks, a viewpoint only 32% of non-Hispanic whites agreed 
with"). 
97. See Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 77, at 8 (''Not surprisingly, this 
demographic profile has translated into judicial decisions that reflect the shared backgrounds 
of the judges. As John Hart Ely explained, there is a 'systemic bias in judicial choice of 
fundamental values, unsurprisingly in favor of the values of the upper-middle, professional 
class from which most judges ... are drawn."' (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST 59 (1980))); see also id. at 9 ("First, the creation of a racially diverse bench can 
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every case in an informed manner, but appellate courts provide crucial op-
portunities for judges to discuss cases, provide insight from their own expe-
rience, bring underlying assumptions in parties' arguments to the surface, 
and ensure that biases do not take the discussion off-track and deny justice 
to a party. Diversity on the bench encourages all members on an appellate 
court to think more broadly .98 Chief Justice Peggy Quince of the Florida 
Supreme Court, the first black women to serve in this position, said that 
"[s]he feels that having black women judges at the appellate level makes a 
difference."99 She explained: 
"Just your mere presence makes people stop and listen. Your colleagues may not 
agree and your perspective may not make a difference in the particular case at is-
sue, but it opens the minds of your [colleagues] to different perspectives ... to the 
table that would not otherwise have had a voice."100 
Studies of appellate courts also bear out the tangible effects that a 
woman or a person of color may have on the outcome of a case. Studies 
have shown that the presence of one woman on an appellate panel increases 
the likelihood that a female sex discrimination plaintiff will prevail. 101 Simi-
larly, the presence of an African American on an appellate panel has been 
found to increase the likelihood that a panel will find in favor of the racial 
minority who is alleging race discrimination. 102 In many cases, there will not 
introduce traditionally excluded perspectives and values into judicial decision-making. The 
interplay of diverse views and perspectives can enrich judicial decision-making .... Second, 
racial diversity on the bench also encourages judicial impartiality, by ensuring that a single 
set of values or views do not dominate judicial decision-making." (quoting Sherrilyn A. Ifill, 
Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & 
LEE L. REv. 405, 410-11 (2000))). 
98. Blackbume-Rigsby, supra note 26, at 679; see infra text accompanying note 
103. 
99. Blackbume-Rigsby, supra note 26, at 679. 
I 00. /d. (quoting Chief Justice Peggy Quince). 
101. Women in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 9 ("[W]omen judges can bring an 
understanding of the impact of the law on the lives of women and girls to the bench, and 
enrich courts' understanding of how best to realize the intended purpose and effect of the law 
that the courts are charged with applying. For example, one recent study demonstrated that 
male federal appellate court judges are less likely to rule against plaintiffs bringing claims of 
sex discrimination, if a female judge is on a panel." (citing Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & 
Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
389, 390 (2010))). 
102. Chew & Kelley-Chew, supra note 54, at 194 (citing Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. 
Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. I, 33-34 (2008); see also Nancy 
E. Crowe, The Effects of Judges' Sex and Race on Judicial Decision Making on the United 
States Courts of Appeals: 1981-1996, at 153-59 (June 1999) (unpublished PhD dissertation, 
University of Chicago)). Specifically, Chew and Kelley-Chew explained: 
Even more directly relevant is the provocative emerging research on how increas-
ing the racial diversity of judges-for instance on appellate panels-influences de-
cision-making patterns. These studies find that mixed-race judicial panels (typical-
ly defined as panels with at least one African-American judge) in race discrimina-
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be a tangible, quantifiable outcome-determinative effect of diversity on ap-
pellate courts. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that racial and 
gender diversity on appellate courts is still important. 
With respect to race in particular, several U.S. Supreme Court Justices 
have remarked on the importance of the unique perspective that the late 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, the first black man to sit on the Court, brought 
to the bench. For example, Justice Lewis Powell once articulated how Jus-
tice Marshall's "unique contribution" to the court derived from "his direct 
experience with racial segregation in this country."103 
Additionally, in her tribute to Justice Marshall in the Stanford Law 
Review, Justice O'Connor described how the late Justice "profoundly influ-
ence[ d)" her, a woman who prior to Brown v. Board of Education had not 
been exposed to racial tensions and "had no personal sense . . . of being a 
minority in a society that cared primarily for the majority."104 As Justice 
O'Connor so vividly explained the effect that Justice Marshall had on the 
Court: 
Although all of us come to the Court with our own personal histories and experi-
ences, Justice Marshall brought a special perspective. His was the eye of a lawyer 
who saw the deepest wounds in the social fabric and used law to help heal them. 
His was the ear of a counselor who understood the vulnerabilities of the accused 
and established safeguards for their protection. His was the mouth of a man who 
knew the anguish of the silenced and gave them a voice. At oral arguments and 
conference meetings, in opinions and dissents, Justice Marshall imparted not only 
his legal acumen but also his life experiences, constantly pushing and prodding us 
to respond not only to the persuasiveness of legal argument but also to the power 
of moral truth. 105 
Similarly, the late Justice Byron White described the impact that Jus-
tice Marshall's voice had on him as a jurist, noting: 
Thurgood brought to the conference table years of experience in an area that was of 
vital importance to our work, experience that none of us could claim to match. 
Thurgood could tell us the way it was, and he did so convincingly, often embellish-
tion cases have different decision-making patterns than all-White panels. In a study 
of federal appellate court cases by Adam Cox and of voting rights cases by Thomas 
Miles, the researchers found that mixed-race panels with at least one African-
American judge were more likely to rule for the plaintiffs than all-White panels. 
Nancy Crowe similarly found that mixed-race panels had different outcomes in 
race-discrimination cases; once again, the mid-raced panels were more likely to 
hold for plaintiffs in race discrimination and sex discrimination cases. 
/d. at 194. · 
103. BARBARA A. PERRY, A "REPRESENTATIVE" SUPREME COURT?: THE IMPACT OF 
RACE, RELIGION, AND GENDER ON APPOINTMENTS 137-38 (1991) (quoting from an interview 
with Justice Powell in which he argued that diversifying the bench with underrepresented 
groups can bring new insights to courts). 
104. Sandra Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 
STAN. L. REV. 1217, 1217 (1992). 
105. /d. (emphasis added). 
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ing with humorous, sometimes hair-raising, stories straight from his own past. He 
characteristically would tell us things that we knew but would rather forget; and 
he told us much that we did not know due to the limitations of our own experi-
ence.106 
Justice Marshall's colleagues' attestations that his insight and experi-
ence provided valuable considerations should not be narrowly interpreted to 
be unique to him. Although he was a remarkable person and Justice, the 
impact is duplicable. Additional voices on the courts may provide perspec-
tives that the majority did not know, did not want to know, or did not under-
stand. These voices are crucial to have at the table, even when colleagues 
are not persuaded. Absent such voices, the ultimate reasoning for a case 
could have been different, or at least the discussion could have gone differ-
ently. For example, Justice Ginsburg, particularly while she was the only 
woman on the Supreme Court, often voiced a uniquely female perspective 
to her colleagues and the public, on issues of gender discrimination and, 
specifically in one instance, with regard to why a strip search of a teenage 
girl by school staff could be traumatizing. 107 In another example, Justice 
Thomas also provided unique perspectives as a Southern black man, such as 
when he detailed how affirmative action had left him stigmatized and when 
he spoke about the statement that a burning cross sends. 108 
At other times, there was not a dissenting voice, but if the judiciary 
had been more diverse, perhaps there would have been a dissenting voice or 
a different majority or voice. In the infamous case of Rogers v. American 
Airlines,109 Judge Abraham Sofaer found that American Airlines' grooming 
policy, which provided that women's hair had to meet certain professional 
standards, did not discriminate on the basis of race and gender. 110 However, 
this case may have been decided differently if the judge presiding over the 
case were intimately aware of the differences between white women's hair 
and black women's hair; the burdens that black women must endure to 
make their hair fit prescribed styles; and the temporal, fmancial, and physi-
106. Byron R. White, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REv. 
1215, 1216 (1992) (emphasis added). 
107. Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg: The Court Needs Another Woman, USA TODAY, May 
6, 2009, at lA. Justice Ginsburg has articulated her frustrations with being the only woman 
on the court and how it has affected cases: 
"You know the line that Sandra and I keep repeating ... that 'at the end of the day, 
a wise old man and a wise old woman reach the same judgment'? But there are 
perceptions that we have because we are women. It's a subtle influence. We can be 
sensitive to things that are said in draft opinions that (male justices) are not aware 
can be offensive." The differences between male and female justices, she said, are 
"seldom in the outcome." But then, she added, "[I]t is sometimes in the outcome." 
!d. (quoting Justice Ginsburg). 
I 08. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 86, at 995-96, 1003-04. 
109. 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
110. /d. at 231,233. 
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cally painful difficulties that may be necessary to endure in order to achieve 
the ideal that American Airlines required. 111 Perhaps the case would have 
turned out differently or more diverse considerations would have been in-
volved, or perhaps the style would not have been attributed to a fad started 
by white model Bo Derek, 112 if a black female judge had heard the case. 
Similarly, Dean Kevin Johnson and Professor Luis Fuentes-Rohwer explain 
how one Supreme Court case may have been decided differently if a person 
of Mexican descent had sat on the Court. They asserted: 
[T]he Supreme Court in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce approved the reliance on 
"Mexican appearance" in immigration enforcement and stated that it may be em-
ployed with other factors to justify the questioning of a person about his or her 
immigration status. This holding seems incredible to most persons of Mexican an-
cestry, who appreciate that there is no readily definable "Mexican appearance." 
The Court in Brignoni-Ponce simply failed to recognize that persons of Mexi-
can ancestry run the gamut of physically diverse appearances. Its decision reflects 
a missing perspective, lack of information, and misunderstanding of the Mexican 
American and Mexican immigrant communities in the United States that a Latina/o 
would be less likely to overlook. 
As these examples suggest, stereotypes about Latina!os influence the law in 
ways that often appear to be race-neutral. An awareness of the stereotypes and their 
impacts in relegating Latina/o citizens to second class citizenship might influence a 
judge's approach to a variety of areas of law, including the immigration and anti-
discrimination laws. 113 
Although points such as this one about Brignoni-Ponce may be raised by 
people of all races, and not just by people who are Latino or, more specifi-
cally, of Mexican descent, there is a greater likelihood that they will be 
made if greater diversity exists on the bench. 
Finally, it is important to have diverse appellate courts because a vari-
ety of voices and perspectives are more likely to ensure that unconscious 
biases do not taint the analyses of cases. For example, having a female 
judge on a sexual harassment case or sexual assault case could help to elim-
inate unconscious biases about a woman's dress in cases where clothing and 
appearance are irrelevant. 114 The list could go on and on, but the basic point 
Ill. See generally Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New 
Strands of Analysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079 (2010). 
112. See Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232. 
113. Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 77, at 19-20; see also Kevin R. Johnson, 
On the Appointment of a Latina/a to the Supreme Court, 5 HARv. LATINO L. REv. I, 7-13 
(2002) (highlighting the different perspectives that a Latina/o Justice might bring on a variety 
of issues). 
114. See Tacha, supra note 23, at 272-73 ("[I]n my experience, the presence of wom-
en in judicial roles has raised awareness within the judiciary concerning the subtle, but pow-
erful, implications of language and the use of particular words in judicial writing. More than 
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is that diversity still matters, and that, in the case of women of color, who 
are nearly absent from the federal bench, "firsts" still matter. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, female "firsts" on the bench in any area and on any 
court still matter, but especially for women of color. Women of color still 
have hurdles and obstacles to overcome that their white sisters do not, both 
in terms of symbolism and numbers. 115 While there may be a need for "fem-
inist" or "womanist"116 judges, and for good reason, that call is a different 
one than the call for women of color judges. 
once, as a member of an appellate panel, I have requested very minor changes in opinion 
language to avoid disparaging sex-based connotations."). 
115. See supra Sections liLA-B. 
116. See emmagunde, Womanism, A FEMINIST THEORY DlcriONARY (July 17, 2007), 
http://afeministtheorydictionary.wordpress.com/2007 /07/17 /womanism/ ("Womanism is a 
feminist term coined by Alice Walker. It is a reaction to the reali7.ation that 'feminism' does 
not encompass the perspectives [of] Black women."). 
